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Should an Illinois Tenant Get the
Benefit of the Landlord's Insurance?
JOHN DWIGHT INGRAM*

INTRODUCTION

Tom Tenant is the lessee of a residence; the lessor is Larry Landlord.
The residence is badly damaged by a fire caused by Tom's son's negligent
experimentation with a chemistry set given to him by Tom. Larry's insurer
pays Larry $45,000, the cost of repairing the residence. Larry's insurer, as
subrogee,' then brings an action against Tom and his son, alleging that their
negligence was the cause of the fire damage, and seeking recovery of the
$45,000 it paid to Larry.2
A. WHAT IS SUBROGATION?

"Subrogation is the right of the insurer to be put in the position of the
insured in order to pursue recovery from third parties legally responsible to
the insured for a loss paid by the insurer. ' A right of subrogation can be
created by agreement between insurer and insured,4 by judicial decree,' or
by statute, 6 and serves to put the burden of a loss on the wrongdoer who
caused the loss.7 Thus, in an insurance setting, when an insurer has
* A.B., Harvard University; C.L.U., American College of Life Insurance
Underwriters; J.D., John Marshall Law School; Professorof Law, John Marshall Law School.
Professor Ingram occasionally serves as a consultant, expert witness, or arbitrator in
cases involving questions of insurance law. The author acknowledges with thanks the
excellent support of his very capable Research Assistants, Alyson Ray, David Bradford,
Evelyn Kuck, and especially his former Research Assistant, Brad Berliner.
1. See Part A infra.
2. See Sutton v. Jondahl, 532 P.2d 478 (Okla. Ct. App. 1975).
3. 16 GEORGE J. COUCH, COUCH ON INSURANCE § 61.1 (Ronald A. Anderson & Mark
S. Rhodes eds., rev. ed. 1983).
4. An insurer's subrogation right may be provided for by a clause in the insurance
policy, or in a settlement agreement with the insured.
5. This is usually called equitable subrogation.
6. This is often the case with uninsured motorist coverage. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN.
§ 27-7-5-6 (West 1993) and workers' compensation (see, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 820, para.
305/4a-6 (Smith-Hurd 1996)).
7. COUCH, supra note 3 at § 61.1.
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indemnified its insured, and the insured has a right to seek indemnification
from another party for this loss, the insurer may be subrogated to the
insured's rights. The insurer is substituted for the insured, and stands in the
shoes of the insured as to all or some of the insured's rights. The insurer's
8
rights are therefore equal to, but no greater than, the rights of the insured.
B. THE PURPOSE OF SUBROGATION

Subrogation is based on general principles of equity, and was

9
developed to prevent overcompensation of the insured. Besides avoiding
unjust enrichment of the insured, subrogation also assures "that a wrongdoer
who is legally responsible for the harm [will] not receive the windfall of
being absolved from liability [merely] because the insured" has obtained and
paid for insurance for his l" own benefit. Thus the ultimate payment of the
obligation is "by the person who in equity and good conscience ought to pay
it. "1

I. POSSIBLE RESULTS OF INSURER'S SUBROGATION ACTION
It is universally recognized that an insurer may not be subrogated to
any rights that might exist against its own insured, that is, either a named
2
insured, or a party who is an additional insured as to the particular loss.'
An insurer's right of subrogation applies only to rights the insured may have
against those "who are not parties to or beneficiaries of the insurance
3
relationship that gives rise to the subrogation claim by an insurer."'
In the very common situation described at the beginning of this article,
where the lessor's insurer, as subrogee, seeks to recover from an allegedly
negligent lessee the amount of its payment to the lessor, courts have reached
two exactly opposite conclusions. Some courts have held that, "[i]n the
8. ROBERT E. KEETON & ALAN I. WIDISS, INSURANCE LAW:

A

FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES, LEGAL DOCTRINES AND COMMERCIAL PRACTICES

GUIDE TO

(1988).

9. Subrogation prevents the insured from recovering from both the insurer and a third
party (usually a tortfeasor), which could mean double recovery.
10. When the gender for a personal pronoun could be either male or female, I use the
masculine pronoun generically, due to habit and my masculine personal orientation. By

doing so I avoid the rather awkward "he or she" and the grammatically incorrect "they." I
trust that female authors will balance the scales on the other side.
I should also note that in some places in this article "his" or "he" also stands for
"its" or "it."
11.

COUCH, supra note 3, at § 61.18.

12. KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 8, at § 3,10(a)(1). It would violate basic equity
principles and sound public policy to allow an insurer to recover from its own insured.

Alaska Ins. Co. v. RCA Alaska Communications, Inc., 623 P.2d 1216 (Alaska 1981).
13. Id.
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absence of an agreement between the parties specifying which of them will
carry fire insurance for the benefit of both parties, or an express clause in
the lease relieving a party from his negligence, each party must bear the risk
of loss for his own negligence."' 4 Other courts have held that, "[a]bsent
an express provision in the lease establishing the tenant's liability for loss
from negligently started fires, . . . the insurance obtained was for the mutual
benefit of both parties,"' 5 and the tenant will be treated as a co-insured, at
least for the purpose of defeating a subrogation claim by the lessor's
insurer. 6 Thus, in some cases, the lessor's insurer may pursue a subrogation claim against the tenant unless there is an express agreement to the
contrary. In other cases, the lessor's insurer may not pursue a subrogation
claim against the tenant unless there is an express agreement to the contrary.
II. THE CASE LAW IN ILLINOIS
A. THE EARLY SUPREME COURT CASES

The seminal case in Illinois is Cerny-Pickas & Co. v. C.R. Jahn Co.'7
decided by the Illinois Supreme Court in 1955. The leased premises were
damaged by fire allegedly caused by the tenant's negligence. The lease
provided that the lessee would keep the premises in good repair and return
them in good condition, loss by fire and ordinary wear excepted. It also
provided that the lessor would pay for fire insurance on the building. The
court held that, construing the lease as a whole, it was the intent of the
parties that the lessee was not to be liable for loss by fire regardless of its
cause, and that the lessor was to look only to its own insurance for
compensation." The "yield-up" clause in the lease, requiring return of the
premises in good condition, loss by fire excepted, did not exclude fire
caused by the lessee's negligence. The court also held that relieving the
lessee from responsibility for its own negligence with respect to fire was not
against public policy.' 9 As additional support for its decision, the court
reasoned that, "consciously or unconsciously, the cost of insurance to the
landlord . . . enters into the amount of rent [, and a landlord] necessarily
consciously figure[s] on the rentals to be paid by the tenant as the source of

14. Acquisto v. Joe R. Hahn Enters., Inc., 619 P.2d 1237, 1239 (N.M. 1980).
15. Alaska Ins. Co. v. RCA Alaska Communications, Inc., 623 P.2d 1216, 1218
(Alaska 1981).
16. See, e.g., Safeco Ins. Co. v. Capri, 705 P.2d 659 (Nev. 1985).
17. 131 N.E.2d 100 (I11.1955).
18. Id. at 103.
19. Id. at 102.

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 17

.... In practical effect the tenant paid the cost
the fire insurance premiums
20
insurance.,
of the fire
The court faced a similar situation in 1968 in Stein v. Yarnall-Todd
Chevrolet, Inc. 21 The lease provided for return of the premises in good
condition, ordinary wear and tear or damage by fire or other casualty
beyond lessee's control excepted.22 The lessor contended that the phrase
"beyond lessee's control" distinguished this case from Cerny-Pickas, and
that the intent of the parties was that the lessee would be liable for damage
due to its own negligence. Despite the apparent logic of this argument, the
court held that the lease as a whole showed an intent that lessee not be
liable for its own negligence. 23 The court was also unpersuaded by the fact
that, unlike Cerny-Pickas, there was no provision in the lease in Stein that
the lessor would obtain fire insurance on the building.2 4
The Stein court seemed to rely primarily on the erroneous analysis by
the Cerny-Pickas court of the insurance requirements of lessor and lessee.
In Cerny-Pickas, the court stated:
Under the construction urged by the lessor it would be
necessary for both parties to the lease to carry fire
insurance if they are to be protected. The lessee would
have to insure against fires due to his negligence, and the
lessor against fires due to other causes .... It would be a
tortured construction, indeed, to say that under the lease
here it was proposed that the lessor would procure fire
insurance to cover fire risks save those which might be
attributable to the negligence of the lessee or its employees. Under such a construction the lessee, to protect
itself, then would seek an unusual, if not unique, policy
to cover the risk of its own negligence, but nothing more.
The only reasonable conclusion we can draw is that the
parties intended, judging by their entire expression in the
lease, that the lessors were to procure fire insurance and
were to look to it to protect them from loss by fire,
including fires which might be caused by the lessee's
negligence.2 5

20. Id. at 104.
21. 241 N.E.2d 439 (III. 1968).

22. Id.

23. Id. at 442.
24. Id.
25. Cerny-Pickas, 131 N.E.2d at 103.
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This shows a deplorable lack of understanding of property and casualty
insurance. Only the lessor has an insurable interest in damage to the
ownership interest in the leased premises. The lessee's need for insurance
in regard to damage to the lessor's building is for liability insurance
covering damage caused by the lessee's negligence. Certainly, every
prudent lessee will carry insurance protecting against the lessee's liability to
the lessor and any others for damage due to the lessee's negligence. There
is no reason at all for the lessee to buy any other insurance to cover this
risk.
In 1975, in One Hundred South Wacker Drive, Inc. v. Szabo Food
Service, Inc.,26 the court further extended the protection afforded to the
lessee by Cerny-Pickas. In One Hundred South Wacker Drive, there was
damage to the leased premises and to other parts of the lessor's building,
allegedly due to the lessee's negligence. The lease provided for return of
the premises in good condition, ordinary wear and loss or damage by fire
or other casualty excepted.2 7 As in Cerny-Pickas, there was no exception
for negligence of lessee. The court held that this and other lease provisions,
taken as a whole, indicated that the lessor was to obtain fire insurance to
protect its interest in the building,28 and that the parties intended to
exculpate the lessee for its negligence, not only for damage to the leased
premises, but to the remainder of the premises as well,29 even though the
"yield-back" clause did not address the latter contingency.3" It seems
logical that, if the parties intended that the lessee would be exculpated for
its own negligence for damage to allparts of the building, not just damage
to the leased premises, they would be expected to expressly so provide,
since they did provide for exculpation as to damage to the leased premises.
And while the court quotes several other lease provisions, it does not really
indicate how these show such a broad exculpatory intent.
B. APPELLATE COURT CASES

1. FirstDistrict
In the years following One Hundred South Wacker Drive, the Illinois
appellate courts decided several cases in which the court was required to
interpret and apply the guidelines which the Illinois Supreme Court had laid
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

326 N.E.2d 400 (Ii. 1975).
Id. at 401.
Id. at 404.
Id. at 405.
Id. at 403.
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down. In Englehardt v. Triple X Chemical Laboratories,Inc.," the First
District court focused primarily on the "yield-up" provision in the lease,
which required the tenant to yield up the premises in good condition, "loss
by fire and other casualty not caused by lessee, and ordinary wear excepted
. .32 The court said the phrase "not caused by lessee" made this
situation different from Cerny-Pickas;lessors could sue lessee for the latter's
negligence, and need not look to their own insurer for recovery.
A few years later, in Continental Casualty Co. v. Polk Brothers,
Inc.,33 another First District panel broadened the inquiry to try to take into
account all of the lease provisions which might be relevant to the issue.
The "yield-up" clause excepted only wear and tear, with no reference to
lessee's negligence. Another provision allowed lessor to repair damage
caused by lessee's negligence, and be reimbursed by lessee. There was also
a provision for untenantability of the premises: if partially damaged by fire,
without fault of lessee, the lessor would repair the premises at its expense;
if the premises were made wholly untenantable, as was the case here, lessor
could elect to terminate the lease, or repair at lessor's expense.
The court held that the first two provisions were general and did not
make reference to fire.34 Only the untenantability provisions did so.
Applying the canon that specific provisions control, the court said this
showed an intent that lessor would not have an action against lessee if the
premises were totally destroyed by fire." Therefore, lessor's insurer would
not have a subrogation action against lessee.
However, as Justice McGloon correctly pointed out in his dissent, the
majority ignored the fact that the untenantability provision gave lessor the
36
So
right to recover for lessee's negligence on partial damage by fire.
only
there was no intent to free lessee from all negligence claims and look
to insurance. 7 Additionally, the untenantability provision gave lessor two
choices: it could terminate the lease; then, under the "yield-up" provision,
Justice
lessee would have to return the premises in good condition."
McGloon therefore urged that, looking at all the provisions of the lease, the

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

369 N.E.2d 67 (II1. App. Ct. 1977).
Id.at 69.
457 N.E.2d 1271 (II1. App. Ct. 1983).
Id. at 1274.
Id.at 1275.

36. Id.at 1279.
37. Id.
38. Id.
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parties intended to hold lessee liable for its negligent damage to the

premises. "9

2. Second District

The Second District court has decided two cases in -recent years. In
both cases the court attempted to construe the lease provisions as a whole,

and to determine therefrom the intent of the parties. In 1986, in First
National Bank of Elgin v. G.MP.,40 the court started its analysis with the

proposition that absent an express covenant to the contrary, a tenant bears
common law responsibility for damage from its own negligence. Where the
lease does not expressly provide that the lessee will be free from liability for
its own negligence, the intent of the parties must be gleaned from the lease
as a whole.

Here, the lease required the tenant to maintain the premises in the same

condition, excepting normal wear and tear. The lessee was required to keep

the premises in good repair, except for fire or other causes beyond lessee's
control. There was no provision in the lease requiring the lessor to carry

insurance on the building. The lessee was required to hold the lessor
harmless for any loss or damage arising out of an occurrence on the
premises. The lessee would be exempt from structural maintenance and
major electrical or plumbing repairs unless due to the lessee's negligence.
The court held that this last provision, considered in the context of the lease
as a whole, indicated an intent to hold -the lessee responsible for its
negligence. There was no evidence or indication that the lessor carried
insurance or was to obtain insurance on the building. Therefore, the court
held that the intent of the parties was for the lessee to be liable.
Two years later, a different panel of the Second District started with a
quite different presumption. In McGinnis ex rel. C.LE. Service Corp. v.
LaShelle,4 ' the lessor's insurer and the lessor sued the lessee for negligence
and breach of contract for failing to purchase fire insurance. The lease
required that the lessee pay for license, taxes and insurance on the leased
supper club building, and for upkeep of the property.4 Also, the lessee
was required to maintain the premises in the same condition and not commit

39. Id. at 1279-80.
40. 499 N.E.2d 1039 (II1. App. Ct. 1986).
41. 519 N.E.2d 699 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988).

42. Id. at 700.
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waste.43 The lessor obtained insurance on the building on the day the lease
was executed."
The court commenced its analysis by stating that a tenant is considered
a co-insured of the landlord absent an agreement to the contrary. Therefore,
the lessor's insurer did not have a subrogation right against the lessee. The
court also held that there was no breach of contract by the lessee. The lease
required the lessee to pay for insurance, but not to buy it. The court found
that lessor's purchase of insurance on the day of the lease showed an intent
for the lessor to be responsible for obtaining insurance, and for the lessee
to be responsible only for paying premiums. Significantly, the court did not
consider an alleged breach of the lease provisions to not commit waste and
to maintain the property in the same condition, as this issue was not raised
until the lessor's reply brief. Consideration of these provisions along with
the other terms of the lease might have altered the court's finding of intent.
3. Third District
The Third District court first considered this question in Ford v.
Jennings45 in 1979. This case involved a negligence action by the lessor
against the lessee and a subtenant of the lessee. The "yield-up" clause in
the lease excepted loss by fire or inevitable accident, and ordinary wear and
tear. The court held that this clause barred a negligence action against the
47
tenant, as in Cerny-Pickas46 and One Hundred South Wacker Drive.
However, the court also held that, in the absence of either consent of lessor
or privity of contract, the lessor may recover from a subtenant for its
negligence.
The 1986 case of Anderson v. Peters"l involved an oral lease. Justice
Scott's majority opinion quoted extensively from, and followed, Sutton v.
Jondahl,49 a 1974 Oklahoma appellate court case which has been cited and
followed in several other jurisdictions. Sutton created a rule that a tenant
is considered to be a co-insured under the landlord's insurance policy,
absent an express agreement to the contrary, and therefore the landlord's
insurer could not bring a subrogation action against the tenant.

43. Id.
44. Id.

45. 387 N.E.2d 1125 (I11.App. Ct. 1979).
46. Cerny-Pickas & Co. v. C.R. Jahn Co., 131 N.E.2d 100 (Il1. 1955).
47. One Hundred South Wacker Drive, Inc. v. Szabo Food Serv., Inc., 326 N.E.2d 400
(111. 1975).
48. 491 N.E.2d 768 (111.App. Ct. 1986).
49. 532 P.2d 478 (Okla. Ct. App. 1975).
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Justice Heiple wrote a vigorous and well-reasoned dissent,"° from
which it seems appropriate to quote at length:
The majority opinion chooses to exonerate tenants
who negligently cause fires and damage leased premises.
Such decision, rooted in public policy considerations
expressed in cases from other jurisdictions, is both poor
public policy and is contrary to the common law of
Illinois.
At common law a tenant is responsible for damage
to leased premises resulting from his own negligence.
However, Illinois courts have given a liberal interpretation
to yield-up clauses, holding that exceptions for fire
damage includes fires caused by the tenant's negligence.
The instant case, however, is distinguishable [from
Cerny-Pickas] in that there is no exculpatory clause of
any kind or any other evidence that traditional landlordtenant law would not apply. As it was aptly stated in a
case which liberally construed an exculpatory clause:
" * * * [sic] the key factor in determining
whether the parties intended to exculpate lessee
negligence is the allocation of insurance burdens
as evidenced by the terms of the lease."
As the tenant admits in his brief, there was no mention of
insurance or tenant liability for negligence during lease
negotiations. Accordingly, it is incomprehensible how it
can be concluded that the landlord intended to exonerate
the tenant from his own negligence or carry him as a coinsured on the insurance policy.
The effect of the majority's decision would be that
whenever the landlord insures the premises against fire
loss, the tenant could not be held liable for negligently
causing the fire. To begin with, that is simply not the law
in Illinois. In Ford,the landlord had insured the premises
and exculpated the tenant from his own negligence.
However, we held that a sublessee who negligently caused
a fire could not have the benefit of that provision. Were
we to accept the majority's reasoning, Ford would be
50. Anderson v. Peters, 491 N.E.2d 768, 772 (Iii. App. Ct. 1986) (Heiple, J.,
dissenting).
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effectively reversed. Even though defendant there was a
tenant of a tenant, he would, under the reasoning of the
majority here, still be insulated from liability, since the
gist of the majority's holding is that a contract of fire
insurance constitutes a de facto waiver by the landlord of
recovery for a fire caused by the negligence of the
occupier of the premises.
The Oklahoma case relied on so heavily by the
majority [Sutton v. Jondahl] is simply wrong. The cited
portion of the case is laced with lofty preachments about
natural justice and equity. Properly defined, of course,
everyone agrees with natural justice and equity. As used
in Sutton, however, such pronouncements are a dodge and
an evasion of the real issue which is a fundamental tenet
of common law. That is, that people should be responsible for their own negligence.
The Sutton case is further flawed by a gross misstatement of the law. It is held that '* * * [sic] the law
considers the tenant as a co-insured of the landlord absent
an express agreement to the contrary * * * [sic].' Once
the Sutton court made this holding, the case was over. In
fact, this is the exact opposite of Illinois law as expressed
in Cerny-Pickas. The tenant is only a "co-insured" when
there is something in the lease which can be interpreted as
exonerating him from his own negligence.
Illinois law is supportive of the tenants' right to
contract in their lease agreements to shift the consequences of their negligence in causing fires. That is clear. We
have no such contract in the instant case, however, and it
is not the function of the court to either make a new
contract for the parties or to find a contract where none
exists.
In the final analysis, insurance, which the majority
finds to be paramount, is almost irrelevant. There is no
question that a guest or a business invitee on premises is
liable for negligently causing fire or damages to the
premises. Are tenant occupiers under an oral lease
entitled to different consideration? A logical extension of
the majority's reasoning in this case would extend exoneration to anyone negligently causing a fire if the owner
had a fire insurance policy. Perhaps it could even be
extended to protect the negligent tenant, guest or business

[Vol. 17
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invitee when the owner didn't have insurance since it
might be reasoned that such occupiers had a right to
assume that the owner had taken out insurance for their
protection. And, if that proposition is accepted, why limit
exoneration to negligence causing fires? Why not extend
it to all negligence? That is the absurdity of the majority
position."'
Three years later, in Fire Insurance Exchange v. Geekie,s2 Justice
Heiple was joined by Justice Wombacher, and thus was able to author the
majority opinion. In Geekie, a son purchased a home from his father, and
then orally leased it to his father. The son insured the building for fire
losses, and the father purchased a renter's policy to cover loss or damage to
his personal property and his exposure to liability for negligence.
Justice Heiple began his analysis by stating that Anderson v. Peters3
was incorrectly decided (as was Sutton v. Jondahl4 ) and is therefore
overruled."5 He continued by pointing out that the Anderson majority had
acknowledged that a tenant bears common law responsibility for damage to
the premises from his own negligence, but had then abandoned the common
law of Illinois and held that, absent an express agreement to the contrary,
the tenant is considered a co-insured of the landlord on the latter's fire
insurance on the building. Justice Heiple pointed out that the established
law in Illinois is that, in the absence of an express agreement to the
contrary, a tenant is liable for damage to the premises due to his own
negligence.5 6 He further noted that Illinois courts have given liberal
interpretations to exculpatory yield-up clauses which expressly or impliedly
relieve a tenant from liability for damage due to his own negligence."
However, Justice Heiple then pointed out, if such a clause is not included
in the lease, traditional landlord-tenant law, which holds the tenant
responsible for his own negligence, still applies. The tenant can contract in
the lease to shift the burden of loss due to his negligence. But if such a
provision is not included in the lease, "the court should not indulge in a
legal fiction to create such a term and alter the parties' contract." 8
51. Anderson, 491 N.E.2d at 772-773.
52. 534 N.E.2d 1061 (I11.App. Ct. 1989).
53. 491 N.E.2d 768 (I!. App. Ct. 1986).
54. 532 P.2d 478 (Okla. Ct. App. 1975).
55. 534 N.E.2d at 1062.
56. Id. (citing Ford v. Jennings, 387 N.E.2d 1125 (I11.App. Ct. 1979)).
57. Id. at 1062 (citing Cerny-Pickas & Co. v. C.R. Jahn Co., 131 N.E.2d 100 (111. App.
Ct. 1955)).
58. 534 N.E.2d at 1062.
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In Geekie, both landlord and tenant maintained separate insurance
policies covering their own risks and exposures to loss and liability. As
Justice Heiple stated, nothing indicated "that the landlord intended to
exonerate the tenant from his own negligence or carry him as a coinsured."59 So, the tenant should be liable for his own negligence, and the
landlord's insurer may maintain a subrogation action. In Justice Heiple's
view, "[t]his result is consistent with previously established Illinois
precedent and, importantly, it satisfies equitable concerns by placing the
burden of the loss where it ought to be - on the negligent party."6'
C. A FEDERAL CASE

Soon thereafter, in Regent Insurance Co. v. Economy Preferred
Insurance Co.,6' a United States district court was faced with the question
of subrogation by a landlord's insurer against a negligent tenant. 62 After
noting the disagreement between the Second District of the Illinois Appellate
Court in McGinnis63 and the Third District in Geekie,6' the court stated
that it would have to try to predict how the Illinois Supreme Court would
rule on this question.65
The court decided that the Illinois Supreme Court would adopt the
analysis and rule propounded by Justice Heiple in Geekie.66 The court
rejected the rule applied in Anderson and McGinnis that the tenant is
considered a co-insured absent an express agreement to the contrary.67 As
the court noted, Anderson (upon which the McGinnis court relied heavily)
6 8 an
cited no Illinois law; it cited and relied upon only Sutton v. Jondahl,
Oklahoma appellate court case.
Turning instead to Illinois law, the court noted that a tenant is
responsible for his own negligence. A tenant is only a co-insured when
there is something in the lease which can be interpreted as exonerating the

59. Id.
60. Id. Of course, since the tenant here had liability insurance, the actual payment to
landlord's insurer will presumably be made by tenant's liability insurer. This should be the
result in most of these landlord-tenant cases.
61. 749 F. Supp. 191 (C.D. I11.1990).
62. Id. at 193-94.
63. McGinnis ex rel. C.I.E. Serv. Corp. v. LaShelle, 519 N.E.2d 699 (111.App. Ct.
1988).
64. Fire Ins. Exch. v. Geekie, 534 N.E.2d 1061 (I11.App. Ct. 1989).
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Regent Insurance, 749 F. Supp. at 194.
68. 532 P.2d 478 (Okla. Ct. App. 1975).
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tenant.69 Here, in Regent Insurance Co., there was no exculpatory yield-up
clause; no express agreement exculpating tenant from negligence; only wear
and tear was excepted; and there was no mention of fire in the exculpatory
clause.70 Therefore, the court held that the common law rule holding the
tenant liable for his own negligence would apply, and the tenants were not
co-insureds. 7" The court predicted that the Illinois .Supreme Court would
apply the rule of Geekie: a tenant is liable absent an express agreement to
the contrary.72
D. THE ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT REVISITED

The most recent word on this subject from the Illinois Supreme Court
came in Dix Mutual Insurance Company v. LaFramboise" in 1992. The
majority of the court, in an opinion by Justice Bilandic, said that, just
because the lease does not expressly exonerate the tenant, that does not
mean the court cannot still find an intent that lessee not be liable after
considering all the lease provisions as a whole.74 The opinion then
proceeded to that consideration.
Justice Bilandic first recognized that the parties here were not
"sophisticated real estate mogul[s],"75 so it was not surprising that there
was no "yield-back" clause in the lease; they probably did not even know
what that clause is. 7 6 He further stated that the lease as a whole did not
reflect any intent that the tenant would be responsible for any fire damage
and have to pay more than $40,000 to the landlord.77
The lease contained a provision that the tenant would assume his own
risk for his personal property, and the landlord would not be responsible for
fire, wind or water damage thereto. 8 The court found that this did not
show an intent to put responsibility for damage to the building on the tenant,
but showed only an intent to exempt the landlord from liability for damage
to the tenant's personal property.7 9 The lease made no provision for
damage to the building, and the court said that this and the provision as to

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
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76.
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79.

Id. at 194 (citing Cemy-Pickas & Co. v. C.R. Jahn Co., 131 N.E.2d 100 (1955)).
749 F. Supp. at 195.
Id.
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597 N.E.2d 622 (I11.
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Id. at 625.
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personal property indicated that the parties intended for each to be
responsible for his own property, which was further supported by the
landlord's taking out fire insurance on the building. 0 Thus, the tenant was
not liable and the landlord must look only to his insurance for compensationY' The court went on to add that, "[u]nder the particular facts of this
case, the tenant, by payment of rent, has contributed to the payment of the
insurance premium, thereby gaining the status of co-insured under the
insurance policy."82 The court "therefore conclude[d] that, under the
provisions of the lease as a whole, the reasonable expectations of the parties,
and the principles of equity and good conscience, the insurance company
.cannot maintain a subrogation action against the tenant under the facts of
this case." 3
Justice Freeman wrote a concurring opinion, -agreeing that the parties
intended for the tenant to be exonerated, but disagreeing as to the tenant's
attaining the status of a co-insured. 4 He correctly pointed out that this
was dictum in any case, since there could be no subrogation if the landlord
had no claim against the tenant.8 5
Justice Freeman further argued that the majority opinion swept too
broadly, and would relieve all tenants of liability for their own negligence.
The majority would give every tenant the status of co-insured unless
expressly indicated to the contrary.86 "By logical extension, the tenant
might then also be considered a co-insured of the landlord with respect to
personal property or negligence liability on the premises."87 Justice
Freeman did, however, recognize "that a tenant may attain the status of a
co-insured where the insured landlord covenants to carry insurance for the
benefit of the tenant." 88
The lone dissenter was Justice Heiple, who by then had moved from
the appellate court to the Illinois Supreme Court.8 9 He first joined Justice
Freeman in urging the impropriety of the majority's broad holding as to the
tenant being deemed to be a co-insured. In his view, the effect of the
majority's "unfortunate decision [was] to make all tenants at any time and

80.
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84.
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Id.
Id. at 626.
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85. See id. at 627.
86. Id.
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88. See id.
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at any place co-insureds with their90landlords [, unless] . . . the parties had
a clear agreement to the contrary.
Justice Heiple then proceeded to analyze the lease provisions to
determine the intent of the parties, and reached a conclusion directly
opposed to that of the other members of the court. Here again, as with our
discussion of Anderson v. Peters,91 it seems appropriate to quote at length
from Justice Heiple's dissent:
An examination of the lease . . . discloses . . .
nothing [that indicates] that the parties intended to absolve
the tenant for his own negligent conduct or that the tenant
was regarded as a co-insured with the landlord .... [T]he
lease clearly exculpated the landlord for liability for
damage caused to the tenant's personal property. No
similar language exculpated the tenant for negligently
damaging the landlord's premises.92
Further, Justice Heiple criticized the majority's conclusion that the
tenant should be deemed a co-insured because "the tenant, by payment of
rent, had contributed to the payment of the insurance premium."93 Justice
Heiple found "no facts in [the] case, either particular or general, that would
cause one to conclude that the tenant contributed to the payment of the
insurance premium or expected to be treated as a co-insured. That
assumption is as gratuitous94as saying that the payment of rent included maid
service and clean linens.,
Justice Heiple's criticism of the majority's reasoning continued:
There is nothing in law to require an insured to look
either first or only to his insurance carrier for recovery of
loss caused by another's negligence. The landlord, in this
case, could have sued the tenant directly. There is also
nothing in law to require a landlord to carry fire insurance
at all. How can it be said that a tenant is deemed to be
a co-insured in a lease when the lease does not even
mention or contemplate insurance? Suppose that the
landlord in this case had not taken out an insurance
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policy. Would the majority say he was debarred from
suing his tenant for negligently burning down the premises? That is to say, would the loss be shifted away from
the negligent tenant and onto the guiltless landlord?95
Justice Heiple concluded his dissent by stating:
In general, I believe that the public is better served if
negligent actors are held responsible for the damage or
injury they cause. While I would agree that parties to a
lease may agree to exculpate a tenant for negligent
conduct which damages the premises and that a lease may
be drawn so as to regard the tenant as a co-insured, I
cannot agree that the lease in this case contemplated any
such thing. Further, I cannot agree that the mere payment
of rent in the absence of other language should operate to
exculpate a tenant who negligently causes damage to the
premises.96
Since Dix Mutual in 1992, the Illinois appellate courts have had two
opportunities to interpret and apply the Illinois Supreme Court's holdings in
97 the trial court dismissed a subrogaDix Mutual. In Nelson v. Greenberg,
tion action brought by the landlord's insurer against the allegedly negligent
tenant. The trial court, sitting in the Second Appellate District, based its
action on the precedent case in that district, McGinnis v. LaShelle.98 The
appellate court reversed and remanded, in view of the recently decided Dix
Mutual case. The court first noted that the leases involved made no express
provision regarding liability for fire damage or the procurement of insurance
by either party.9 9 Therefore, the court stated, Dix Mutual mandated that
the court "must determine the intent of the parties in the present case by
viewing the lease 'as a whole.""" 0 The lease in Nelson contained ' a
provision "that the 'tenants [would] be charged for all breakage."'
Since there was no provision in the lease relating to fire insurance, the court
found that, reading the lease as a whole, "it was the intent of the parties that
the tenant [would] be liable for ... losses resulting from the tenant's negli-
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gence.' 0 2 Therefore, "the tenant [could] be [held] liable for fire damage
caused by his [own] negligence."1"3
Most recently, in American National Bank and Trust Company v.
Edgeworth"°4 in 1993, a panel of the First District of the appellate court
affirmed the trial court's granting of summary judgment for the tenant in the
landlord's action for damages."0 5 In this case, the lease required the
landlord to obtain fire insurance. Other provisions were: if any repair was
necessitated by negligence of the tenant, the tenant would reimburse the
landlord for the cost thereof; the tenant would not commit waste; would
keep the apartment in good repair; would return the premises in like
condition, reasonable wear and tear excepted; and that if the tenant did not
fulfill these responsibilities, the landlord could restore the premises to good
condition and the tenant would pay the cost thereof.'0 6
The court chose not to discuss either the lease or the intent of the
parties expressed therein. Instead, citing Dix Mutual, the court held that
when the lessor obtains fire insurance on the leased premises, the lessee is
absolved of any liability for fire damage even though caused by the lessee's
negligence. The court said this reaffirmed the rule laid down in CernyPickas & Co. v. C.R. Jahn Co. 107 However, the court failed to recognize
that in Cerny-Pickas the yield-up clause excepted loss by fire and ordinary
wear and tear. Thus, the Cerny-Pickas court based its decision on its
finding that the lease as a whole showed an intent for the lessee to not be
liable for fire damage caused by negligence of the lessee.
As feared by Justices Freeman and Heiple in Dix Mutual, the court
went on to hold that the lessee was exculpated as a matter of law.'08 It
based this holding on the faulty rationale of the dicta in Dix Mutual:
Fire insurers expect to pay fire losses for negligent fires
and their rates are calculated upon that basis; indeed, we
may well assume that a great majority of fires are caused
by someone's negligence in a greater or lesser degree.
[Were we to adopt the insurance company's argument,] it
would be necessary for both parties to the lease to carry
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
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Id.
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fire insurance if they are to be protected. The lessee
would have to insure against fires due to his negligence,
The
and the lessor against fires due to other causes ....
be
fire
by
loss
of
risk
the
that
contemplated
parties
insured against and we see no reason to suppose that they
did not contemplate the customary insurance policy which
covers both accidental and negligent fires.
The ancient law has been acquiesced in, and consciously or unconsciously, the cost of insurance to the
landlord, or the value of the risk enters into the amount of
rent. * * * They necessarily consciously figured on the
rentals to be paid by the tenant as the source of the fire
insurance premiums and intended that the cost of insurance was to come from the tenants. In practical effect,
the tenant paid the cost of the fire insurance."19
Based on this reasoning, the court held that
because the tenant in essence pays for the insurance out
of his rent, the tenant, as a matter of law, is exculpated
from liability for negligently causing fire damage to the
building where the landlord procures insurance thereon,
and the landlord must look solely to the insurer for
reimbursement for such losses."°
The argument that the tenant should have the benefit of the landlord's
insurance, because the tenant has effectively paid the insurance premium as
part of the rent, does not survive thoughtful examination. It is undoubtedly
true that, to the extent market conditions permit, a landlord, in setting the
rent, takes into account his own costs, including insurance premiums. But
the same could just as well be said of all of the landlord's overhead and
operating expenses: taxes, interest on loans, depreciation, janitor, premiums
on other insurance policies of the landlord, etc. Should the tenant share the
benefit of all of these items which are part of the rent calculation? Should
the tenant be deemed a co-insured on the landlord's liability insurance? Loss
of rental value? Damage to landscaping? Why should the fire insurance on
the ownership interest in the building be singled out for special treatment?

109. Id. (citations omitted).
110. Id.

19961

LANDLORD-TENANT

INSURANCE SUBROGATION

Equally wrong is the argument that, if the tenant does not get the
benefit of the landlord's insurance on the building, the tenant would have
to obtain and pay for his own insurance on the building, which would result
in multiple insurance policies on the same building and create overlapping
coverage which inevitably means more premiums paid than necessary. The
tenant has no reason or need to buy insurance on the building, except to the
extent that damage to the building would cause a loss to the tenant because
of the tenant's loss of use of the rented premises. As to the risk of damage
to the landlord's ownership interest in the building, the tenant's only
exposure to loss is the possibility that the tenant's negligence will be the
cause of damage to the building. This is a normal, everyday third-party
liability exposure, which is covered by the tenant's own liability insurance
coverage, most commonly included in the renter's package policy covering
his own personal property, his loss of use, and his risk of liability for
damage to the person or property of others. Every prudent tenant should
have liability insurance, and therefore has no need to buy insurance on the
building itself, in which the tenant has no insurable interest anyway.
II.

SUGGESTIONS

Most - probably all - of the problems which have been the subject of
the Illinois cases discussed in this article can be avoided. First, each party
to a lease should recognize the nature and extent of his insurable interest,
and should insure that interest and only that interest. The landlord should
insure the risk of damage to his ownership interest in the building. This
insurance should expressly provide for a right of subrogation for his insurer,
against a tenant or other third party. He should also insure, with liability
insurance, his risk of liability for damage to property of a tenant or others
caused by the negligence of the landlord. And finally, he should insure the
risk of loss of rental income caused by damage to the building, during the
time the building is being repaired.
A tenant, on the other hand, should insure his own personal property
against loss or damage; his possessory interest in the property, that is, injury
due to loss of use of the property; and his risk of liability for his negligence
in causing damage to the rented or other property, or personal injury.
There will thus be no duplication or overlap of coverage. Each party
will arrange and directly pay for the insurance coverage he wants and needs
to protect his own risks and interests related to the rented property. To the
extent that market conditions permit, the landlord will set a rental price that
includes all of his expenses, including all insurance premiums, and leaves
him with a profit. The tenant may freely choose whether the use of the
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premises justifies the proposed rent. It should be of no concern to the
tenant what items of expense are included in setting the rental price.
In addition, the parties to a lease are entirely free to alter the usual
rules as to insurance and liability. It may well be that they will choose to
avoid focusing on any fault of the parties and rather make provisions for
allocating the various risks and costs involved in the ownership and use of
the leased premises. The lease may absolve the tenant of any liability for
damages due to the tenant's negligence. Or the lease may provide that both
parties will have their insurance policies contain a waiver of the insurer's
right of subrogation against the other party."' If that is done, care should
be taken that the insurance policies do indeed contain the required waivers.
It is quite possible that some insurers will include a waiver provision
without any objection and without any additional premium. But some may
refuse.
IV. CONCLUSION

Careful and thoughtful drafting of leases can eliminate, or at least
greatly reduce, the problems that arise as to the insurance and liability of
landlord and tenant. And where the lease does not make proper provisions,
the courts should employ a more rational analysis of the rights and liabilities
of the parties, based on a recognition of the insurable interests involved, the
legal liabilities of the parties, and the contractual rights of lessor, lessee, and
insurer.

11l. Such a lease provision might state:

Landlord and Tenant intend that their respective property loss risks shall
be borne by responsible insurance carriers, and Landlord and Tenant hereby agree
to look solely to, and seek recovery only from, their respective insurance carriers
in the event of a property loss to the extent that such coverage is agreed to be
provided hereunder. The parties hereby waive all rights and claims against each
other for such losses. The parties agree that their respective insurance policies are
now, or shall be, endorsed such that said waiver of claims shall not affect the right
of the insured to recover thereunder.

